TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/040290/0402009.000

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                ╘S)                                                          WORLD, Page 26

SOVIET UNION

War of Nerves


Losing patience with Lithuania, Gorbachev issues orders to cease
and desist. Is he willing to risk bloodshed to keep
secessionists in line?

By MICHAEL S. SERRILL -- Reported by Ann Blackman/Moscow,
Michael Duffy/Washington and Paul Hofheinz/Vilnius


    "To exercise self-determination through secession is to blow
apart the union, to pit people against one another and to sow
discord, bloodshed and death."

    -- Mikhail Gorbachev


    On the surface the two men would seem to be absurdly
mismatched. Mikhail Gorbachev is a master politician who has
pushed aside all competitors for power and won countless
political battles in his struggle to reform the Soviet Union.
He has an army of 4 million at his disposal, and has
demonstrated his willingness to use it to crush civil
disobedience in the Soviet Union's restive Transcaucasian
republics. By contrast, Vytautas Landsbergis, the newly elected
President of the tiny Baltic state of Lithuania (pop. 3.7
million), is a bookish, bespectacled musicologist who never
before held political office. He presides over a breakaway
government that has few laws, no army, no currency, no foreign
recognition and a tenuous hold on its territory.

    Nevertheless, the stubborn nationalist seemed to be holding
his own last week in a tense confrontation with Gorbachev over
Lithuania's effort to break away from the Soviet Union. Day
after day the two fought a battle of communiques. The struggle
reaffirmed a fact that has become increasingly clear since
Lithuania's declaration of independence two weeks ago: the
mild-mannered pianist may turn out to be the Soviet President's
most dangerous enemy -- not because he is so strong, but
because Lithuania represents the first crack in what could be
the collapse of the union that binds the country's 15
republics.

    Early Saturday morning, a column of more than 100 military
vehicles, including 59 tanks, rumbled into the Lithuanian
capital of Vilnius. As residents rushed to their windows, the
convoy clattered by the parliament building, where legislators
were toiling through the night to put the final touches on the
creation of an independent government. Though the caravan
quickly disappeared behind the gates of an army base in
Vilnius, the ominous parade was obviously intended to intimidate
the Lithuanians. But the ploy only persuaded the legislators
to prepare for the worst. They immediately passed an emergency
resolution to transfer their authority to the republic's
representative in Washington in case martial law was imposed.

    Increasingly concerned that events might spin out of
control, the Bush Administration stopped soft-pedaling its
support for the Lithuanians and made it clear to Gorbachev that
military intervention would seriously damage both perestroika
and East-West relations. Said Bush: "Any attempt to coerce or
intimidate or forcibly intervene against the Lithuanian people
is bound to backfire."

    Gorbachev's preoccupation with the secessionists is
understandable. "As Lithuania goes, so goes the nation,"
observed a senior White House official. The volatile standoff
between Moscow and Vilnius came just as radical nationalists
won a majority of seats in the local legislatures of the other
two Baltic republics, Estonia and Latvia. Gorbachev's angry
words had some effect: Estonian Communist Party leaders last
week said the republic should negotiate its secession with
Moscow, while the parliament of independence-minded Georgia
postponed elections until the fall.

    The Supreme Soviet last week fine-tuned a law that would
require a republic to hold a referendum in which two-thirds of
the permanent residents vote in favor of secession. The
national legislature would then review the results and set a
transition period of up to five years before independence could
be achieved. But that statute is unlikely to affect the fait
accompli already presented to Gorbachev by the Lithuanians.

    As each day passed last week, it became more apparent that
Gorbachev was not going to take no for an answer from the
Lithuanians. After a string of ultimatums from the Kremlin had
been ignored or rejected, Gorbachev got tough:

    -- According to the Soviet news agency TASS, additional
Soviet troops were sent across the Lithuanian border to "ensure
the rights" of ethnic Russians and Poles, who make up almost
20% of the republic's residents. Some 30,000 troops were
already stationed in Lithuania.

    -- On Friday all foreign diplomats, including two Americans,
were told to leave Lithuania within twelve hours.

    -- Gorbachev gave the Lithuanians two days to rescind a law
creating a volunteer force to guard the republic's ports and
borders. At the same time, some 1,500 Lithuanian deserters from
the Soviet army were ordered to return to their units by
Saturday. Landsbergis responded by urging deserters to seek
sanctuary in churches.

    The war of nerves began building almost two weeks ago, when
Gorbachev gave the Landsbergis government three days to respond
to a declaration from the Congress of People's Deputies stating
that the republic's secession on March 11 had been illegal.
Landsbergis replied that the Congress's resolution was "without
legal foundation" and a violation of Lithuania's internal
affairs.

    From that point the confrontation escalated. Leaflets
scattered over Vilnius from helicopters urged the Lithuanians
to abide by the Soviet constitution. Unscheduled military
maneuvers were staged in and around the rebel state. Squads of
security police arrived in the eastern Lithuanian town of
Ignalina to reinforce the perimeter of one of the Soviet
Union's largest nuclear power plants. These moves were
accompanied by a shower of anti-Lithuanian decrees from Moscow.
The most ominous was a directive from Gorbachev ordering
Lithuanians to turn in their firearms. He also instructed the
KGB to step up security on the borders and asked the Foreign
and Interior Ministries to tighten control over foreigners in
the republic.

    Throughout the propaganda barrage -- abetted by
anti-Lithuanian coverage in the Moscow media -- Landsbergis and
his colleagues never wavered from their insistence that as the
governors of a sovereign nation, they need not take orders from
Moscow. "Psychological warfare is being waged against
Lithuania," said Landsbergis in a speech to the local
parliament. "I have no doubt that we will bear this pressure.
It is a question of who has sovereignty over this land. Does
it belong to the people of Lithuania or to some other state?"
As for the decree ordering the surrender of firearms,
Landsbergis replied, "It can be enforced only through brutal,
armed force . . . The ghost of Stalinism is walking in the
Kremlin, and the shadow of it lies far to the west" -- over
Lithuania.

    The weapons in the hands of the populace are an estimated
30,000 hunting rifles and shotguns. In the days after the order
from Moscow, no more than a handful were turned in, though a
group of students made a show of surrendering a cache of toy
pistols. When General Ginutis Taurinskas, head of the local
military-training program, told parliament he had obeyed orders
and relinquished weapons and motor vehicles to the Soviets,
jeers filled the hall.

    Even as the situation deteriorated, officials in both
Lithuania and the West were convinced Gorbachev would not dare
intervene militarily. "Things are calm here," said Kazimira
Prunskiene, the tough economist whom Landsbergis had named as
his Prime Minister. "An invasion would provoke a tremendous
crisis. It would be the end of perestroika, and I don't think
Gorbachev is prepared for that."

    Western observers concurred that a full-scale invasion was
unlikely. "What we see now is Gorbachev raising the ante in
what will be hard and drawn-out negotiations," said an American
diplomat in Moscow. "Lithuania has a united population on the
issue of independence, and I don't think they'll back down. And
Moscow has pretty much ruled out force." At independence
ceremonies in Namibia last week, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze said, "We are against the use of force in any
region, and we are particularly against the use of force
domestically."

    The Baltic republics present a special dilemma for
Gorbachev, since they enjoyed independence between the two
World Wars, before being consigned to Moscow by the Nazi-Soviet
pact of 1939 -- an accord the Kremlin has belatedly admitted
was unjust. Thus, Lithuania, as well as Estonia and Latvia,
claims it has been occupied by the U.S.S.R. for the past 50
years. Gorbachev's saber rattling aside, there is every
indication he believes the three republics have the right to
secede, though only after Moscow has agreed to the terms of the
separation. He reiterated the point last week at a meeting with
Estonian officials, reportedly saying, "In the case of a
divorce, it is not important whether the marriage was
contracted legally or not. The property must be divided
nonetheless."

    In Washington and Moscow, analysts felt that the most
sensible course for Gorbachev is to back away from brinkmanship
and begin negotiations with the Lithuanians, who have all along
expressed their eagerness to talk. In a commentary in the
Soviet weekly New Times, political columnist Leonid Mlechin
wrote, "Cooler heads will not ignore the will of the Lithuanian
voters and will start shaping up a mechanism of cooperation
with Vilnius. Any option for resolving this problem with force
will strengthen the position of those in the republics who
believe it is useless to try to reach an agreement with Moscow."


    Others criticized Lithuania for its refusal to consider
Gorbachev's offer of membership in a Soviet federation, with
full autonomy for each republic. "If Lithuania were willing to
remain in the Soviet Union," said a senior White House
official, "Gorbachev would pretty much let them do what they
wanted to on the economic side." But with positions hardening
and Gorbachev worried about losing face, danger was growing
that he might be tempted to use a time-tested Soviet solution
to uprisings by impudent satellites: intimidation with tanks
and guns.